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NOTE
COLOR MONOPOLY: HOW TRADEMARKING COLORS IN THE
FASHION INDUSTRY AND BEYOND EXPANDS THE LANHAM ACT’S
PURPOSE AND POLICY
Briana Reed†
I. INTRODUCTION
When you picture two people fighting over what color crayon they can use
for their latest creation, you would expect the tiff to be in a classroom between
bickering kindergarteners. Instead of kindergarteners, this childish fight over
the “crayon” occurred between two of the most prominent luxury fashion
designers, employing the United States court system as the teacher.
In 1995, the United States Supreme Court decided that single colors can
be trademarked in certain circumstances.1 This paved the way for companies
to own colors and fend off other, sometimes competing, companies from
using them. Luxury fashion and accessories designers have arguably profited
the most in trademarking the colors that have become synonymous with their
brand such as Tiffany Blue2 or Hermés Orange.3 At first glance, the idea of
companies trademarking their branding colors may sound innocent and fair;
however, when you dig into the legal disputes surrounding color
trademarking, you quickly realize color trademarks have opened the
floodgates for color monopolization.
The many issues involved in color trademarks are seen in the legal dispute
between two French fashion houses: Yves Saint Laurent (“YSL”) and
Christian Louboutin (“Louboutin”). Louboutin is a luxury fashion brand
famous for designing women’s heels with red lacquered outsoles.4 In 2008,
Louboutin obtained a trademark for the red-lacquered outsole, thereby
preventing any other fashion designer from applying any shade of red to the
outsoles of shoes.5 YSL released a line of monochrome shoes in 2011, and one

†
Editor-in-Chief, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 16. J.D. Candidate, 2022,
Liberty University School of Law; B.A., 2018, Otterbein University. I would like to thank my
family for always believing in me and encouraging me to never sacrifice long term goals for
short term gains.
1
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 174 (1995).
2
The mark consists of a shade of blue, Registration No. 2359351.
3
The mark consists of this shade of the color orange, Registration No. 4000067.
4
Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 211
(2d Cir. 2012) [hereinafter Louboutin II].
5
Id. at 211–12.
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of the designs included a monochrome red shoe featuring a red outsole.6
Louboutin brought suit against YSL for selling the monochrome red shoe,
alleging it infringed the “Red Sole Mark.”7 The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York resolved this dispute by denying Louboutin’s
trademark claim and, in doing so, promoted free competition and creativity
within the industry.8 The Second Circuit swiftly reversed the lower court’s
decision.9 The Second Circuit was extremely critical of the district court’s
reading of Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products, Co. and the lower court’s
application of the aesthetic functionality doctrine.10
This article will explore how the Second Circuit’s reversal caused a
negative domino effect in subsequent color trademarking decisions, allowing
companies to monopolize and practically “own” individual colors. Although
the district court’s flimsy analysis entangled itself in hypotheticals, its
decision in rejecting Louboutin’s trademark claim was fundamentally
correct. Ergo, the district court reached the right conclusion, but in an
unnecessary, complicated fashion. Part II of this article will explore the
history and evolution of trademark law and its ever-expanding reach. Part III
will discuss the Louboutin and Yves Saint Laurent dispute which highlights
the many problems of single-color trademarks. Part IV will analyze why the
Second Circuit’s reversal was in error and the negative ramifications
stemming from the decision. Part V will propose a solution to the issues
surrounding single color trademarks under the Lanham Act in the fashion
industry and beyond. But to understand why the Second Circuit’s reversal of
Louboutin was incorrect, it is crucial to first understand the basics of
trademark law and the district court’s reasoning and analysis.
II. BACKGROUND
A trademark includes “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof . . . used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his
or her goods . . . from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate
the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.”11 Enacted in 1946,
the Lanham Act allows trademarks used in commerce to be registered with

6

Id. at 213.
Id.
8
Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 457
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) [hereinafter Louboutin I].
9
Louboutin II, 696 F.3d at 228–29.
10
Id. at 223.
11
15 U.S.C. § 1127.
7
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the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).12 The intention of
the Lanham Act was “the modernization of trademark law, to facilitate
commerce and to protect the consumer.”13 An application for trademark
registration requires “specification of the applicant’s domicile and
citizenship, the date of the applicant’s first use of the mark, the date of the
applicant’s first use of the mark in commerce, the goods in connection with
which the mark is used, and a drawing of the mark.”14
There are four general categories of trademarks.15 Case law describes these
categories as generic, descriptive, suggestive, and arbitrary or fanciful,
although “the lines of demarcation . . . are not always bright.”16 Generic terms
are not protected under the Lanham Act, such as the word “light” used to
describe a type of beer.17 Likewise, descriptive terms, unless they have
acquired secondary meaning, are not protected under the Lanham Act.18 A
term is descriptive if it “clearly denotes what goods or services are provided
in such a way that the consumer does not have to exercise powers of
perception or imagination.”19 To demonstrate secondary meaning, the public
must attach “primary significance” of the term to the producer of the product
instead of the product itself.20 Suggestive terms are eligible for protection
under the Lanham Act without the secondary meaning requirement.21 A term
is deemed suggestive if it “requires imagination, thought and perception to
reach a conclusion as to the nature of goods.”22 Arbitrary or fanciful marks
have no real connection to the product or service they are associated with but
are “common words applied in unfamiliar ways” or marks invented for
trademark use, respectively.23
To establish trademark infringement, claimants must show that they own
a valid, protectable trademark; that the alleged infringer used a
12

15 U.S.C. § 1051.
In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citing Park
‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985)).
14
15 U.S.C. § 1051.
15
1 CHARLES E. MCKENNEY & GEORGE F. LONG III, FEDERAL UNFAIR COMPETITION:
LANHAM ACT 43(A) § 3.2 (2020).
16
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
17
MCKENNEY & LONG, supra note 15, at § 3.3.
18
Id. at § 3.4.
19
Id.
20
Id. at § 3.5.
21
Id. at § 3.6.
22
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting
Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs. Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
23
MCKENNEY & LONG, supra note 15, at § 3.7.
13
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“reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation” of the mark in
commerce without the trademark owner’s consent; and that the alleged
infringer’s use is likely to cause consumer confusion.24 The policy behind this
protection is closely linked to unfair competition law and operates to
safeguard consumers from deceit and confusion, while also protecting the
trademark owner’s property.25 Essentially, trademarks protect organizations,
designers, and businesses from other members in commerce passing off
another’s product as their own by using a mark that is closely associated with
the trademark owner’s product.26 Although trademarks were historically
source identifiers in the form of words, images, or shapes, trademark law now
extends to sounds, scents, flavors, and even colors.27
A.

Color as a Trademark
1.

A Pressing Problem: Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co.

In Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., the United States Supreme Court
decided that color alone can sometimes meet trademark requirements.28
Before Qualitex, color trademarks were prohibited based on shade confusion
and color depletion theories.29 Qualitex used a green-gold color on its dry
cleaning press pads it sold to dry cleaners.30 In 1991, a Qualitex rival,
Jacobson Products, started manufacturing and selling dry cleaning press pads
in a similar green-gold color.31 After registering the color with the USPTO in
1991, Qualitex added a trademark infringement claim to ongoing litigation
with Jacobson over an unfair competition claim.32 Qualitex won the lawsuit
in the district court, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
the Lanham Act did not permit colors to be trademarked.33

24
Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 259 (4th Cir.
2007) (citing CareFirst of Md., Inc. v. First Care, P.C., 434 F.3d 263, 267 (4th Cir. 2006); 15
U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a)).
25
1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 2:2,
2:7 (5th ed.).
26
Id. at § 2:22.
27
Id. at § 3:1.
28
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 174 (1995).
29
MCCARTHY, supra note 25, at § 7:44.
30
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 161.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
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Qualitex presented a perplexing problem to the Supreme Court because
the Courts of Appeals had differed in rulings regarding color trademarks.34
The Court held that color can satisfy the statutory definition of a trademark,
and although a color does not automatically inform a consumer of an item’s
origin, over time a color may develop into a source indicator for consumers.35
The Court reasoned, rather shortsightedly, that because a word that acquired
secondary meaning can act as a trademark, there was no reason why a color
with secondary meaning should not be extended trademark protection.36 The
Court then went as far as to say that “there is no obvious theoretical
objection” to single color trademarks.37
The Court quickly swept aside Jacobson Products’ color depletion theory
and shade confusion arguments. Jacobson Products’ color depletion
argument claimed that allowing producers to use color trademarks would
“deplete” the available color pool to the point competitors are significantly
disadvantaged.38 The Court called Jacobson’s color depletion argument
“unpersuasive” and only an “occasional problem.”39 When faced with
Jacobson’s argument that color trademarks would create uncertainty within
litigation about what color is protected and that the shade confusion problem
is much more difficult than distinguishing word and symbol similarities, the
Court stated: “We do not believe . . . that color, in this respect, is special.”40
When considering the possibility of color monopolization, the Court noted
that the functionality doctrine, which is supposed to bar the protection of a
product’s feature as a trademark when the feature is required for the product
or if the feature affects the product’s cost or quality, “protects competitors.”41
Although the Court found that colors can be trademark protected, there
are limitations. Colors are only protectable as a trademark when they have
achieved a secondary meaning and identify a brand, indicating its source.42 It
34

See NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 1990) (prohibiting
trademark protection for colored tabletop sweetener packets); In re Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that pink for insulation
functions as a trademark); Master Distribs., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219, 224 (8th Cir.
1993) (declining to establish a prohibition on color trademarks based on confusion and
inconsistency).
35
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 168.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 167.
41
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 169.
42
Id. at 166.
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is important to note that under Qualitex, color cannot be protected if it is
deemed functional, which “mean[s] that the color is essential to the use or
purpose of the product, or affects the cost or quality of the product.”43 A
design is deemed functional “if the design affords benefits . . . with which the
design is used, apart from any benefits attributable to the design’s
significance as an indication of source, that are important to effective
competition by others and that are not practically available through the use
of alternative designs.”44 Although the point lacked thorough analysis, the
Qualitex Court noted that, when considering aesthetic functionality, the
ultimate test is “whether the recognition of trademark rights would
significantly hinder competition.”45
In theory, aesthetic functionality is supposed to bar color depletion and
legitimate competitive disadvantages.46 But under the Lanham Act, Congress
intended for an exercise of judgment to be used when determining color
trademark registrability.47 Under this theory, color trademarks are not to be
handed out like candy by the USPTO, but they are to be thoroughly analyzed
to ensure that the monopoly granted is limited, does not unduly hinder
competition, and does not create barriers for others to enter the market.
While some courts historically upheld single color trademarks for industrial
products, color trademarks in the fashion industry were only used “in distinct
patterns or combinations of shades that manifest a conscious effort to design
a uniquely identifiable mark embedded in the goods,” such as the Burberry
check pattern or the Louis Vuitton multicolor monogram pattern.48
2.

Think Pink: In re: Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.

The Owens-Corning Fiberglas case is often cited when considering color as a
trademark, and the Supreme Court used it to justify its decision in Qualitex.49 In
1980, Owens-Corning sought trademark registration of the color pink for

43

Louboutin I, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 450 (citing Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 (AM. L. INST. 1995).
45
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 170 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17,
cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1995)).
46
Id.
47
In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
48
Louboutin I, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 451; The [Burberry] mark consists of a tan background,
light tan vertical and horizontal lines, black vertical and horizontal lines, white squares, and
vertical and horizontal lines, forming a plaid pattern, Registration No. 3529814; LV,
Registration No. 4192541.
49
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165; see, e.g., In re Haruna, 249 F.3d 1327, 1334 n. 1. (Fed. Cir.
2001).
44
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fiberglass insulation.50 The USPTO denied Owens-Corning trademark
application on the grounds that pink was not distinctive of Owens-Corning’s
fiberglass insulation.51 When determining color trademarks, the Federal Circuit
noted that factors such as the nature of the product, color-use, number of colors
or color combinations available, number of competitors, and customary
marketing practices within the industry, are to be considered.52 Trademark
registrability is to be decided based on the unique facts of each case; if a color
primarily serves a utilitarian purpose, then it cannot be granted protection.53 The
Federal Circuit held that the color did not yield a utilitarian advantage or hinder
competition within the insulation market. Further, the court found no
overriding public policy consideration barring Owens-Corning’s claim to pink
since it was the only company to utilize the color and there were very few
insulation manufacturers.54
When considering the trademark when it was first filed, the USPTO noted
that there was no competitive need for colors to remain available to all insulation
competitors, nor was there an industry practice of dyeing insulation before sale.55
The Federal Circuit then swept aside the long-standing shade confusion
argument, agreeing with the USPTO Board that deciphering color shades “‘is no
more difficult or subtle than . . . where word marks are involved.’”56 Most
importantly, pink has no relationship to insulation production.57 OwensCorning’s dedicated marketing scheme of the Pink Panther, pink merchandise,
and numerous taglines, such as “think pink,” “put your house in the pink,” and
“pink of perfection,” sealed the deal for the Federal Circuit—it reversed the
USPTO’s decision by granting the pink trademark.58
Judge Jean Galloway Bissell wrote the lone dissent, finding four reasons why
the established jurisprudence barring color as a trademark should have been
followed.59 With one powerful quote, Judge Bissell made clear why single color
trademarks should not be allowed: “color itself is free.”60 Even after the Lanham
50

Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1118.
Id.
52
Id. at 1120.
53
Id. at 1121.
54
Id. at 1121–22.
55
Id. at 1122.
56
Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1123 (quoting In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 221
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1195, 1198 (T.T.A.B. 1984)).
57
Id.
58
Id. at 1126–28.
59
Id. at 1129 (Bissell, J., dissenting).
60
Id. at 1128 (quoting Gillette Safety Razor Co. v. Triangle Mech. Lab’ys Corp., 4 F. Supp.
319, 324 (E.D.N.Y. 1933)).
51
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Act was enacted, circuit courts continually refused color trademarks for
decades.61 The dissent emphasized the settled jurisprudence and the unanimous,
respected opinions of regional circuit courts barring single color trademarks.62
Additionally, although color alone was not allowed to be trademarked, color as
an element of a trademark was allowed.63 The dissent then pointed to the
competition hindrance argument which claims that allowing single color
trademarks in certain circumstances could create unwanted barriers in the
marketplace.64
The dissent pointed out that Owens-Corning established dominance in the
insulation market not necessarily because of its superior product but because the
company poured resources into marketing and advertising, making pink
synonymous with fiberglass insulation.65 Owens-Corning’s advertising and
marketing permeated the industry so much that some people refused to buy
insulation unless it was pink, taking the “put your house in the pink” tagline to a
new level and effectively barring entry into the market.66 Importantly, the dissent
emphasized that the point of trademarks is to prevent consumer confusion, not
to bar entrants into the market.67 Essentially, “palming off is the issue, not the
color.”68 Sometimes complicated problems have simple solutions, and the
dissent suggested that effective labeling would protect against consumer
confusion.69
3.

The Pantone Color System, a Scientific Language of Color

It is impossible to analyze color trademarks without recognizing the
powerful company that owns the most popular color software used by many
color-dependent industries.70 While Judge Bissell wrote that “color itself is
free,” Pantone makes sure it is not.71 Pantone claims broad intellectual

61

Id. at 1129.
Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1129 (Bissell, J., dissenting).
63
Id. at 1130.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1130 (Bissell, J., dissenting).
69
Id.
70
Color Identification and Control, PANTONE, https://www.pantone.com/articles/howto/color-identification-and-control (last visited Jan. 11, 2021).
71
Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1128 (Bissell, J., dissenting) (quoting Gillette Safety Razor
Co. v. Triangle Mech. Lab’ys Corp., 4 F. Supp. 319, 324 (E.D.N.Y. 1933)).
62
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property rights over its color names, formulas, software, numbers, and more
because, for Pantone, “it’s all about control.”72
The Pantone Color System offers fashion designers, graphic designers, and
product designers a universal color system.73 Started in 1963, Pantone created
the Pantone Matching System to help ensure consistent color reproduction
within the printing industry.74 Pantone created a revolutionary “color
language” in which each color gets a unique numerical code and name.75
Now, Pantone offers over 10,000 color standards across its systems for print,
web design, textiles, and product design.76 Each color system has its own book
full of Pantone color chips or swatches that designers can choose from.77
The Pantone Color System for fashion design—the system from which
Louboutin’s Chinese Red derives—comes in a variety of material formats
such as cotton, polyester, nylon, plastic, and metallic shimmer.78 The color
systems ensure that designers can customize and see the exact pigment of
every aspect of their design down to a zipper’s color or a stiletto’s lacquered
coating. More importantly, the Pantone Color System offers a scientifically
accurate way to distinguish colors and shades that the human eye cannot.
Pantone does not sell the actual ink that the manufacturer will use for the
item, but each unique color code informs the printer or computer of how
much RGB or CMYK is needed to perfectly replicate the color.79
This universal color language ensures that each Louboutin stiletto is
perfectly lacquered with the trademarked Pantone 18-1663 TPX.80 Many
other luxury designers have pioneered fashion trends and icons but none of
them have successfully created a monopoly, until now. The lack of objectivity
in color trademarks is a problem when dealing with minute shade differences.
If the test for infringement is “whether the reasonably prudent customer
72

PANTONE, supra note 70.
Id.
74
About Pantone, PANTONE, https://www.pantone.com/about-pantone (last visited Mar.
6, 2021).
75
Diana Budds, How Pantone Became the Definitive Language of Color, FAST CO. (Sept.
18, 2015), https://www.fastcompany.com/3050240/how-pantone-became-the-definitivelanguage-of-color.
76
What Are Pantone Color Systems?, PANTONE, https://www.pantone.com/colorsystems/pantone-color-systems-explained (last visited Jan. 11, 2021).
77
See Budds, supra note 75.
78
Pantone Color Systems–Fashion, Home + Interiors, PANTONE,
https://www.pantone.com/color-systems/for-fashion-design (last visited Jan. 11, 2021);
Louboutin I, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 455 n.5.
79
Budds, supra note 75.
80
Louboutin I, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 455; PANTONE 18-1663 TPX, PANTONE,
https://www.pantone.com/color-finder/18-1663-TPX (last visited Mar. 19, 2021).
73
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would be likely to be confused as to source, sponsorship, affiliation or
approval,” it is unreasonable to expect the average judge or juror to
differentiate between subtle CMYK or RGB percentages because the
perception of color is not a precise science.81 Individuals see colors
differently, sometimes even drastically differently for those that are color
blind.82 Scientific studies have shown that men and women perceive colors
differently, making the test for infringement wholly subjective.83 Specifically
regarding the color red, psychological studies show that men perceive women
wearing red as more attractive, making red more than just aesthetically
functional.84
B.

Aesthetic Functionality: When Looking Good is Functional

If a trademark is deemed functional, it cannot be protected.85 How
functionality has been applied in color trademark cases is questionable at best
because aesthetic appeal has been deemed functional. For example, the
aesthetic functionality doctrine barred the protection of John Deere green
because “farmers prefer to match their loaders to their tractor.”86 The Federal
Circuit deemed the color black functional because the color decreased
apparent motor size.87 Under Qualitex, the “ultimate test of aesthetic
functionality . . . is whether the recognition of trademark rights would
significantly hinder competition.”88 The Supreme Court in Qualitex quoted
G. K. Chesterton to explain how a color can serve as a non-trademark
function by fulfilling the “noble instinct for giving the right touch of beauty
to common and necessary things.”89 A red-colored sole on a high heel does
in fact give a touch of beauty to a common and necessary thing. A sole is
81

MCCARTHY, supra note 25, at § 7:45.70.
Berit Brogaard, Why We Don’t See the Same Colors, PSYCH. TODAY (June 29, 2020),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-superhuman-mind/202006/why-we-dontsee-the-same-colors.
83
MCCARTHY, supra note 25, at § 7:45.70; see also Nicole A. Fider & Natalia L. Komarova,
Differences in Color Categorization Manifested by Males and Females: A Quantitative World
Color Survey Study, 5 PALGRAVE COMMC’NS 1, 6–7, (2019),
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0341-7.pdf.
84
Adam D. Pazda, Andrew J. Elliot & Tobias Greitemeyer, Perceived Sexual Receptivity
and Fashionableness: Separate Paths Linking Red and Black to Perceived Attractiveness, 39
COLOR RSCH. & APPLICATION 208 (2013); Andrew J. Elliot & Daniela Niesta, Romantic Red:
Red Enhances Men’s Attraction to Women, 95 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1150 (2008).
85
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995).
86
Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 98 (S.D. Iowa 1982).
87
Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
88
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 170.
89
Id.
82
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necessary for every functioning shoe. Typically, a sole’s color is beige or black
and relatively pedestrian. Was Louboutin inventive and creative when he saw
his assistant painting her nails and got the idea to lacquer the soles of his shoe
designs? Absolutely, but that does not mean that the global brand deserves to
own a color in an industry that requires use of all shades of the Pantone color
system to thrive.
The Seventh Circuit used the example of a football’s oval shape to convey
what aesthetic functionality is and what it is not.90 A football’s shape is
functional in that every brand must utilize the oval design in order to
manufacture footballs.91 A feature is functional when it “is unlike those
dispensable features of the particular brand that, like an arbitrary identifying
name, rivals do not need in order to compete effectively.”92 A shoe sole design
is not a dispensable, arbitrary feature but a required part of a functioning
shoe.
Further, if a color affects the cost or quality of the product, it is deemed
functional.93 The extra step in the manufacturing process of painting the sole
red naturally costs more than producing a bland colored sole. It is important
to note that the Red Sole Mark is a fleeting, temporary feature of the
Louboutin shoe. The Christian Louboutin website features a product care
page on which customers are warned: “the red lacquer on our soles will wear
off with the use of the shoes.”94 Why should a court grant exclusive color use
to a company for a temporary feature?
C.

Secondary Meaning

In order to prove a trademark violation under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff
must show that he or she has a valid trademark, ownership of the mark, and
the defendant’s use of the mark causes a likelihood of confusion.95 Likelihood
of confusion is a question of fact and exists “when the consumers viewing the
mark would probably assume that the product or service it represents is
associated with the source of a different product or service identified by a
similar mark.”96 Historically, courts, including the Second Circuit, analyze

90

W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1985).
Id.
92
Id.
93
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165.
94
Product Care, CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN,
https://us.christianlouboutin.com/us_en/product-care (last visited June 6, 2020).
95
A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 210 (3d Cir. 2000).
96
Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 862 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Ford
Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 292 (3rd Cir. 1991)).
91
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likelihood of confusion by looking at the eight “Polaroid factors.”97 In
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electrics Corp., Polaroid brought suit against
Polarad, alleging that its use of the name “Polarad” infringed on numerous
trademarks and constituted unfair competition.98 The lower court dismissed
the claims, holding that neither party sufficiently proved consumer
confusion.99 Polaroid, whose business was mostly focused in optics and
photography, was aware of Polarad’s business of selling televisions roughly
two decades before bringing suit.100 As Polarad’s business became successful,
Polaroid decided to take action and relied on two things to bring suit against
Polarad.101 First, Polaroid used communications mistakenly sent to Polaroid
meant for Polarad as evidence of confusion.102 Second, Polaroid used
Polarad’s sales of corrector plates used in televisions as evidence of Polarad’s
dealings in the same industry.103 The court set forth several factors to analyze
likelihood of confusion:
[T]he strength of his mark, the degree of similarity between
the two marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood
that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion,
and the reciprocal of defendant’s good faith in adopting its
own mark, the quality of defendant’s product, and the
sophistication of the buyers.104
In Polaroid, the court held that although the plaintiff’s trademark was
strong and the similarity between the marks was substantial, evidence of
actual confusion was “not impressive” and thus affirmed the lower court’s
judgment.105
Although no factor is dispositive, a defendant’s intent is a critical factor.106
If a court finds that a defendant acted in good faith, it can go a long way in
reducing or eliminating liability.107 For example, Elizabeth Taylor Cosmetics
was denied trademark registration for the brand’s newest fragrance
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“Elizabeth Taylor’s Passion,” due to a likelihood of confusion stemming from
Annick Goutal’s “Passion” fragrance.108 Elizabeth Taylor Cosmetics
continued plans for production and filed an action for declaratory judgment
despite warnings from Annick Goutel’s counsel.109 Both fragrances were sold
at similar price points and at similar stores although the products did not
directly compete.110 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York noted that although Elizabeth Taylor did not act in
utmost good faith, it was unlikely that the company knew of any specific
trademark registration by Annick Goutal when “Passion” was announced.111
Additionally, the court noted that because of the heightened awareness of
Elizabeth Taylor’s name, it is “obvious . . . that Taylor did not adopt the
‘Passion’ name in an attempt to bootstrap sales of its products onto sales of
Goutal’s products . . . .”112 Interestingly, the court brought in the highly
relevant but often overlooked factor of sophistication of the buyers when
analyzing likelihood of confusion.113 Since women are “sophisticated
fragrance consumers” and “know their perfume,” the likelihood of confusion
tipped in Elizabeth Taylor’s favor.114
In Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., the Ninth Circuit analyzed a
likelihood of confusion issue when Levi Strauss brought suit against Blue Bell
for allegedly infringing upon a trademarked red pocket tab.115 Strauss first
used its trademarked pocket tab on overalls and extended its use onto jackets
and pants.116 Strauss subsequently filed additional trademarks for garment
tabs in more colors.117 After Strauss filed a trademark for a vertical shirt
pocket tab, Blue Bell started using a horizontal pocket tab with the words
“Maverick” or “Wrangler” on the shirts.118 Strauss argued that since an earlier
lawsuit determined that its use of pant pocket tabs acquired a strong
secondary meaning, that it therefore owned the trademark rights to all
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garment tabs.119 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the lower court’s finding that
there was no secondary meaning in the tab within the shirt market.120 In order
for Strauss to prove consumer confusion, there needed to be evidence that
Blue Bell’s shirt tabs caused “a reasonably knowledgeable and prudent
purchaser” to think the shirt was a Strauss design.121 No such evidence
existed, and the court concluded that there was no likelihood of confusion.122
D.

Trade Dress: The Intellectual Property Right that Does Not Belong

Trade dress is the confusing younger sister of the trademark that does not
really belong in the intellectual property family. It extends the concept and
protection of trademarks to the visual appearance of products or
packaging.123 As trade dress continues to expand and protection broadens, it
has the capability to fully erode the true policy of trademarks because the line
between trade dress and trademarks are blurred by courts.124 While courts
attempt to reassure the legal community that the functionality doctrine will
prevent unwanted monopolies, “these reassurances are curiously
unrealistic.”125
In 1998, Congress decided the Lanham Act needed “fine tuning” to reflect
modern business practices.126 The Lanham Act was subsequently amended to
explicitly allow trade dress registration and even grant protection for
unregistered trade dress.127 In 1999, the Lanham Act was further amended to
explicitly incorporate trade dress into the statutory language.128 Trade dress
differs from trademarks in that it involves the “total image of the product and
may include features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture,
graphics, or even particular sales techniques.”129 Essentially, trade dress
grants protection under the Lanham Act for an aesthetic.
Under the Lanham Act, proving a trade dress infringement is very similar
to proving trademark infringement. A plaintiff must show that he or she has
119
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a protectable interest, which is established by evidence that the design is
“inherently distinctive,” or that it has acquired secondary meaning and it is
not functional.130 When the trade dress in question is deemed inherently
distinctive, proof of secondary meaning is not required.131 Courts have
extended trade dress protection to the “festive” exterior and interior motifs
of a Mexican restaurant chain, Chanel No. 5 perfume packaging, and the
iconic Hermès Birkin bag.132
Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana was the first modern trade dress case decided
by the Supreme Court.133 The dispute between the two restaurant chains
arose when Taco Cabana sued Two Pesos for trade dress infringement.134
Taco Cabana described its trade dress as “a festive eating atmosphere”
decorated with artifacts and bright colors.135 Further, Taco Cabana claimed
the exterior design of its restaurants with neon stripes, vivid borders, and
bright umbrellas as part of its trade dress.136 Following a jury trial, judgment
in the lower court was entered in favor of Taco Cabana.137 Two Pesos alleged
that the jury’s finding of no secondary meaning contradicted their finding of
inherent distinctiveness, as the jury was instructed that “Taco Cabana’s trade
dress was protected if it either was inherently distinctive or had acquired a
secondary meaning.”138 The Court of Appeals rejected Two Pesos’ argument,
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the
Courts of Appeals: whether inherently distinctive trade dress is protectable
without a showing of secondary meaning.139
The Supreme Court noted that there was “no persuasive reason” to apply
a secondary meaning requirement to trade dress.140 The Court found no
textual basis for the argument and held that requiring secondary meaning for

130
Lauren Krohn, Cause of Action for Trade Dress Infringement under § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, 7 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 725 (1995).
131
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 776 (1992).
132
Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1116–17 (5th Cir. 1991);
Chanel, Inc. v. Suttner, No. 109-369, 1956 WL 8101, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 1956); The mark
consists of the configuration of a handbag, Registration No. 3,936,105.
133
GAMBINO & BARTOW, supra note 126, at § 1.06.
134
Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 765.
135
Id. (quoting Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir.
1991)).
136
Id.
137
Id. at 766.
138
Id. at 766–67.
139
Id. at 767.
140
Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 770.

386

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:3

inherently distinctive trade dress undermined the Lanham Act’s purpose.141
Requiring secondary meaning, per the Court, would have anticompetitive
effects and harm small businesses because denying protection until
secondary meaning is established could allow a competitor to adopt the trade
dress in other markets and deter the creator from expanding into new
markets.142 Per the Court’s reasoning in Taco Cabana, requiring a business to
demonstrate that consumers attribute an aesthetic to its product harms the
marketplace because, if another business adopts a similar aesthetic in another
market, the original business may not want to expand into new markets.
Essentially, the reasoning behind granting Taco Cabana’s alleged trade dress
is to protect the business should they choose to build an Italian restaurant
with neon awnings.143 What cool comfort for Two Pesos, who sold its
restaurant chain to Taco Cabana the following year.144
The Supreme Court somewhat refined its holding in Taco Cabana a few
years later when children’s clothing designer Samara Brothers sued WalMart. Samara Brothers designs and manufactures seersucker clothing,
decorated with floral, heart, or fruit appliques.145 In 1995, Wal-Mart
contracted with a supplier to manufacture children’s clothes for the summer
season.146 Wal-Mart sent photographs to its supplier of Samara Brothers’
clothing, which the supplier copied with some minor adjustments.147 WalMart’s sales of the seersucker knock-offs boomed, generating over $1 million
in profits.148 Behind the scenes, a buyer for JCPenney contacted Samara
Brothers to complain that Samara Brothers clothing was being sold at WalMart for less than what JCPenney was allowed to sell it for.149
Samara Brothers conducted an investigation, which unearthed numerous
retailers selling seersucker knockoffs and subsequently brought suit for
141
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unregistered trade dress infringement.150 After the jury found in favor of
Samara Brothers, Wal-Mart claimed that “there was insufficient evidence to
support a conclusion that Samara’s clothing designs could be legally
protected as distinctive trade dress” and renewed its motion for judgment as
a matter of law.151 The district court denied Wal-Mart’s motion, and the
Second Circuit affirmed.152
Although there is nothing explicit within the Lanham Act requiring proof
that trade dress is distinctive, the Supreme Court noted that courts
universally impose the requirement because, absent distinctiveness, there is
no risk of consumer confusion.153 There are two long-settled ways
distinctiveness can be established. First, inherent distinctiveness is shown if
the product’s “intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source.”154
Second, a mark can acquire distinctiveness by “develop[ing] secondary
meaning, which occurs when, ‘in the minds of the public, the primary
significance of a [mark] is to identify the source of the product rather than
the product itself.’”155
The Court looked back to its reasoning in Abercrombie and Qualitex and
determined that “design, like color, is not inherently distinctive.”156 The
Court further reasoned that when analyzing product design—like color—
there is no predisposition for consumers to equate the feature with the
source.157 The Court then made a powerful statement: “[E]ven the most
unusual of product designs . . . is intended not to identify the source, but to
render the product itself more useful or more appealing.”158 Because product
designs serve other purposes beyond source identification, application of
inherent distinctiveness harms consumer interests.159 The Court went on to
reject Wal-Mart’s argument that Taco Cabana established that productdesign trade dress can never be inherently distinctive.160 The Court
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distinguished between product-design trade dress and product packaging,
deeming Taco Cabana’s restaurant décor to be packaging instead of design.161
The Court admitted it would be hard to draw lines between product design
and product packaging trade dress in the future, such as deciphering whether
the iconic glass Coca-Cola bottle is design or packaging.162 Nevertheless, the
Court dismissed the concerns on the grounds that such cases would not be
frequent.163 In the end, the Court held that unregistered trade dress can be
protected if there is a showing of secondary meaning.164 The blurred lines
between product design and product packaging proves difficult in trade dress
cases, and it appears that how a lawyer frames the issue is what really affects
the outcome at trial.165
Beyond seersucker children’s clothing, trade dress protection has been
extended to the relatively simple, yet comically expensive, Hermès Birkin
handbag. In its trademark registration, Hermès claimed that the entire design
of its Birkin bag was distinctive.166 The rectangular bag with a padlock clasp
is named after actress Jane Birkin and is known for being the most expensive
and exclusive handbag in the world.167 A single Hermès Birkin handbag can
cost up to $500,000.168 The handbag is so exclusive you cannot go into a store
and purchase one, instead you must receive an invitation from the company
to purchase one.169 Hermès successfully defended the Birkin design against
several fashion companies that produced “confusingly similar” handbags.170
In 2000, the Second Circuit hinted that Hermès has trade dress protection
covering numerous of the brand’s handbags, including the iconic Kelly bag,
because “Hermes’ designs continue to indicate their source.”171 The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York painted an
161
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interesting picture of how item exclusivity and a defendant’s intent can be
deciding factors in trade dress and trademark infringement cases.172 Each
Hermès Kelly bag takes a painstaking 16 hours to handcraft, and any bags
containing imperfections are destroyed.173 Hermès claims each element of its
Kelly bag is distinctive, from the thin handles to its trapezoidal shape.174
Undercover investigators recorded the defendant’s store salespeople telling
customers that its bags were “direct copies” of iconic Hermès handbags.175
The district court used the defendant’s direct copying as evidence that
Hermès’ products are source-identifiers.176 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that the high value of original Hermès
handbags comes, at least in part, from their scarcity.177 The Second Circuit
wrote about elevating status when purchasing a high-end, genuine article and
how the public is harmed when knockoffs are purchased.178 While the elite
Hermès market may experience de minimus harm when knockoffs are on the
market, are Louboutin’s sophisticated shoppers actually harmed by YSL’s
monochromatic Tribute shoe? YSL did not misrepresent its shoe as a
Louboutin knockoff or direct copy, instead, YSL simply re-released its iconic
shoe in a primary color in a different shade, style, and aesthetic from
Louboutin’s classic designs.179
E.

Trademark Dilution: I Made That Mark “Famous”

Section 1125(c) of the Lanham Act grants some special rights to those
whose marks are deemed famous. A mark is considered famous if it becomes
“widely recognized by the general consuming public” as a source indicator of
goods made by the mark’s owner.180 When determining if a mark is famous,
courts balance the factors of the mark’s reach, actual recognition of the mark,
and the extent of sales of goods under the mark.181 If an alleged infringer’s use
of the famous mark causes dilution, the mark’s owner can request an
injunction.182 The Lanham Act outlines two different forms of trademark
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dilution: dilution by tarnishment and dilution by blurring.183 Dilution by
tarnishment occurs when the famous mark is associated with another mark
or trade name that harms the famous mark’s reputation.184 Dilution by
blurring occurs when the similarity between the famous mark and other
mark or trade name impairs the famous mark’s distinctiveness.185 The
Lanham Act explicitly states that injunctive relief may be granted regardless
of any economic injury, likelihood of or actual consumer confusion, or
competition.186
The protection extended to famous trademarks is reminiscent of the strict
liability system that operates within patent law.187 The Supreme Court tried
to raise the burden of proof for damages for famous trademarks in Moseley
v. V Secret Catalogue.188 Victor’s Secret, a lingerie store owned by a husband
and wife team in a Kentucky strip mall, sent out a grand opening
advertisement in a newspaper distributed to military residents in Fort Knox,
Kentucky.189 An army colonel saw the advertisement and sent it to Victoria’s
Secret, believing the local lingerie store was attempting to usurp the wellknown Victoria’s Secret mark.190 Counsel for Victoria’s Secret wrote to the
owners of Victor’s Secret and requested “immediate discontinuance of the
use of the name ‘and any variations thereof.’”191 The owners changed the
name of their store to Victor’s Little Secret and Victoria’s Secret, unpleased
with the minor name change, subsequently filed suit.192 The owners of
Victor’s Little Secret did not dispute that Victoria’s Secret is a famous
trademark, leaving the court only to determine if any dilution occurred.193
The Supreme Court agreed with the Fourth Circuit that when the marks at
issue are not identical, the mere fact that consumers associate the two marks
is not enough to establish dilution.194 The Supreme Court reasoned that such
association does not automatically diminish the famous mark’s source
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identification power.195 While the Court noted that gathering evidence of
dilution may be difficult in some cases, it is “not an acceptable reason for
dispensing with proof of an essential element of a statutory violation.”196 The
Court then reversed the favorable rulings for Victoria’s Secret and remanded
the case.197
While the ruling sounded like a win for fundamental fairness within
trademark protection and litigation by requiring some proof of harm,
Congress passed the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, which allows
an injunction against an alleged infringer if the mark is likely to cause
dilution.198 In virtually eliminating any requirement of harm, Congress has
granted those with famous marks an extremely strong right. This begs the
question: what makes a trademark famous? While the Lanham Act outlines
a few non-exhaustive factors as mentioned above, one court based its
decision almost solely on sales figures.199
Anheuser-Busch sought registration for “PATAGONIA” to be used in
connection with a new line of beer.200 Unsurprisingly, the outdoor clothing
manufacturer Patagonia filed suit against Anheuser-Busch, asserting
trademark dilution and infringement.201 Anheuser-Busch argued that
Patagonia is not a famous trademark and moved to dismiss the brand’s
claims.202 The California Central District Court noted that for a mark to be
famous, it must be “‘truly prominent and renowned.’”203 The court
determined that Patagonia sufficiently alleged that its mark is famous due to
extensive advertising efforts, $10 billion in sales since 1985, and the fact that
it owns several federal trademarks in connection with its goods.204
If extensive advertising and billions of dollars in sales is what indicates
trademark fame, the broad right granted to famous marks are only vested in
a few megabrands. Is the protection extended to famous marks really
fulfilling the policy behind trademarks? Would a home furnishings store
named Victor’s Secret actually infringe upon Victoria’s Secret lingerie empire
195
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and cause consumer confusion? Would a farming operation named
Patagonia cause consumer confusion? The hypotheticals could go on forever,
but the writers of the Lanham Act seem to presume that consumers get
confused easily.
III. PROBLEM
A.
Louboutin v. YSL District Court: You Can Have Your Color and
Wear it, Too
In 1992, the luxury French fashion house Louboutin started
manufacturing shoes with red soles.205 The idea for the Red Sole Mark
allegedly came to be when shoe designer Christian Louboutin saw his
assistant painting her nails red.206 Inspired by the red lacquer, he decided to
design shoes with red lacquered outsoles and gained enormous popularity.207
The shiny red-lacquered soles have become signature to his brand.208
Louboutin now sells over a million shoes a year with prices ranging from
$695 to over $6,000 a pair.209 As the district court eloquently noted, when
people see red-lacquered soles they immediately think of Louboutin’s
shoes.210 A-list celebrities, models, and U.S. political figures sport the brand
on the regular.211 Although rival French fashion house YSL retorted that
Louboutin’s red sole shoes are copied from King Louis XIV’s red sole dancing
shoes or, alternatively, Dorothy’s iconic ruby red slippers from “The Wizard
of Oz,” Louboutin’s marketing expenditures and creativity surrounding its
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red sole shoes paid off in 2008 when the USPTO granted the brand’s
trademark registration for the Red Sole Mark.212
In 2011, Louboutin approached YSL regarding the brand’s decision to rerelease a red monochromatic shoe titled the Tribute and three other shoe
designs featuring a red monochromatic design.213 YSL, founded in 1961, is a
luxury fashion house, championed for pioneering the women’s trouser suit,
that sells both men’s and women’s clothing, accessories, and—of course—
shoes.214 YSL had previously released an entirely red version of the Tribute
shoe in the brand’s 2008 Cruise Collection without issue.215 YSL refused to
take its monochromatic red shoe off the market, alleging that shoes with red
outsoles had been an occasional appearance in the brand’s collections since
the 1970s, and Louboutin subsequently filed suit in federal court seeking a
preliminary injunction and seven claims under the Lanham Act.216 YSL
asserted two counterclaims against Louboutin’s trademark infringement
claim.217 YSL sought cancellation of the red sole trademark on the grounds
that it is not distinctive, but rather ornamental and functional.218 As a
consequence, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York faced a novel question: can a single color be trademark protected
within the fashion industry?
In an illustrative and grandiose opinion reminiscent of Justice Benjamin
Cardozo, the district court sifted through facts and law to determine whether
Louboutin’s Red Sole Mark was valid. First, to succeed in its claim for
trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act,
Louboutin needed to establish that the Red Sole Mark warranted protection
and that YSL’s use of the mark would cause consumer confusion about the
shoe’s origin.219 Because Louboutin’s Red Sole Mark was registered with the
USPTO, there was a rebuttable presumption that the Red Sole Mark was
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valid.220 The district court’s analysis and eventual conclusion relied heavily
on the Qualitex case, in which the Supreme Court decided that color alone
can sometimes meet trademark requirements.221 The district court noted that
color could meet the legal requirements of a trademark if its purpose is source
identification “without serving any other significant function.”222 Under the
Third Restatement of Unfair Competition approach, which the court applied,
a design is deemed functional if its “‘aesthetic value’ is able to ‘confer a
significant benefit that cannot practically be duplicated by the use of
alternative designs.’”223
Considering both Qualitex as established precedent and principles set out
in the Restatement, courts historically approved single color trademarks for
industrial products, but the nature of these products had to conform to
industry-wide standards so that the color was simply acting as a source
identifier.224 The district court noted that both the commercial and industrial
sector purposes for color trademarks do not fit with the characteristics and
needs of fashion.225 After all, we do not see models during fashion week
“sashaying down the runways in displays of the designs and shades of the
season’s collections of wall insulation.”226 As the years and seasons go by,
what is considered fashionable changes and is replaced with new trends and
designs.227 Due to the transient nature of the fashion industry, the district
court noted that color is a “critical attribute of the goods” and a “primal
ingredient” of fashion.228 Without color, fashion “as expressive and
ornamental art” would fail to flourish.229 Color’s function in fashion is to be
aesthetically appealing.230 The district court revived the color depletion
theory cast aside by the Supreme Court in Qualitex when it reasoned that
granting a creator the right to appropriate a color would “hang an ambiguous
threatening cloud” around similar shades, creating blockades where creators
would be fearful to enter, thus harming the commerce and marketplace
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competition.231 In sum, the district court found that granting a color
monopoly to one designer would hinder commerce, competition, and artistic
expression.232
Transitioning to aesthetic functionality, the district court noted that in
other industries, aesthetic appeal alone has been considered functional for
trademark purposes, thereby barring protection under the Lanham Act.233
The district court quoted the Seventh Circuit in Honeywell where, just a few
short years prior, the court said “‘[a]esthetic appeal can be functional; often
we value products for their looks.’”234 While analyzing aesthetic functionality,
the district court cheekily brought up Christian Louboutin’s statement on
why he chose red to adorn the soles of shoes he designs.235 Christian
Louboutin said he chose red to give the shoes “energy,” to be “engaging,” and
to attract men to the women who wear Louboutin shoes.236 The district court
cleverly brought up that the red outsole does affect the sole of the shoe
because it makes it more expensive.237 The Supreme Court left a gaping hole
when it set forth the requirement that a product feature is functional when it
affects the cost or quality of the item.238 The Supreme Court did not specify
that the functional feature had to make the product less expensive; thus if a
mark or feature makes a product more expensive to manufacture it could be
found to be functional under existing law.239 The district court noted that for
high-end brands like Louboutin, higher production costs for features like the
Red Sole Mark make the end result more exclusive for consumers.240
In regard to unfair competition, the district court found that Louboutin’s
claim to the color red was too broad and inconsistent with the Lanham Act.241
If Louboutin succeeded in its trademark claim, not only would the high-end
shoe market be adversely affected, but the cloud of litigation could extend to
other articles of clothing as well.242
231
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Looking beyond the patently unfair competition and negative public
policy ramifications, the district court brought up additional problems that
Louboutin’s trademark registration presented. First, Louboutin’s registration
did not mention a specific shade of red, instead, the registration granted
Louboutin “the color red.”243 Louboutin eventually identified the Pantone
No. 18-1663 TP as the color applied to the soles of its shoes, but due to
varying absorption and reflection issues depending on what material the
color is applied to, Louboutin proposed the district court grant it a range of
colors around the specific Pantone color it supposedly owns.244 Note that
although Louboutin stated which Pantone color it allegedly owned,
trademark registrations cannot be amended, so the color represented on the
registration is the one that governs.245
If Louboutin is granted its desired range of red, the brand would effectively
be “appropriating more than a dozen shades of red.”246 In support of its
proposal, Louboutin relied on a district court case where the court granted
an injunction requiring the infringer to use a Pantone color differing at least
40 percent from the registrant’s.247 The injunction did not grant the registrant
a protectable interest in the color pink itself, but a protectable interest in the
combination of pink with the other features of the product packaging.248 So,
the injunction in the case Louboutin cited was easy for the district court to
distinguish due to the practical and consequential differences in the claims.
To tamper with the absurdity of its request, Louboutin proposed that its
trademark would be limited to high-heeled shoes, but that limitation is not
found in its trademark registration, leaving the door wide open for Louboutin
to litigate over any type of footwear desired.249 Louboutin’s trademark
registration covers high-end shoes of all styles, not just its signature stiletto,
giving the brand an expansive footprint of ownership in the industry.250
Additionally, Louboutin has a history of pursuing legal action beyond the
scope of its trademark registration, leaving Louboutin’s argument that the
Red Sole Mark only covers high-fashion footwear moot.251 The same year
Louboutin filed suit against YSL, Louboutin filed another suit against French
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fast-fashion giant Zara for producing a peep-toe, red pump similar to
Louboutin’s “Yoyo” heels.252 The French court held that there was no chance
of consumer confusion between the two brands and that Louboutin’s
trademark registration was “too vague.”253
Ambiguity exists within the Red Sole Mark about what sole coating is
prohibited to other designers partnered with the sole’s red color. The
trademark registration specifically describes a lacquered red sole.254 However,
the designs that Louboutin sued over featured flat red soles.255 So, while
Louboutin alleges that its hawk-like protection over red-soled shoes stops at
high-end stilettos, its actions show otherwise.
The alternative option Louboutin presented to the district court was even
more absurd than the prohibited color range proposal. Louboutin proposed
that other designers could “seek advance clearance from Christian Louboutin
himself” to determine which shade of red he would graciously allow a
designer to use.256 After all, who better to spread “the fan of shades
before . . . to see at what tint his red light changes to amber,” than the one
claiming to own the color.257 Further, when YSL alleged that the color applied
to its shoes was not the Pantone color Louboutin claimed ownership of,
Louboutin’s only retort was that it is too close to the shade of red it uses and
could not explain why this specific YSL shoe collection and none of the ones
with red outsoles YSL previously released are confusingly similar.258
The final strike for the district court against Louboutin’s claim presented
itself in a deposition. In a deposition with Christian Louboutin, YSL inquired
as to what specific shoe infringed the Red Sole Mark, and Christian
Louboutin answered by saying he “will have to think about it.”259 In response
to whether Louboutin would object to any shade of red used on outsoles of
shoes, Christian Louboutin’s counsel instructed him not to answer.260 The
district court concluded that the Lanham Act could not serve “as the source
of the broad spectrum of absurdities that would follow recognition of a
trademark for the use of a single color for fashion items,” and denied
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Louboutin’s requested injunction.261 Perhaps a more favorable ruling would
have been rendered if Louboutin claimed its mark was famous.
B.

YSL v. Louboutin Second Circuit: Taking the Crayon out of the Quiver

Unsurprisingly, Louboutin appealed the unfavorable judgment rendered
by the district court. However, the Second Circuit did not follow in the
district court’s footsteps and instead reversed the lower court’s decision.262
The error in the Second Circuit’s reversal can be illustrated by the fanciful,
albeit simple, illustration the district court presented, in which Picasso sues
Monet for using a shade of indigo that he used to depict water in his Blue
Period paintings.263 In the hypothetical, Picasso asserted exclusive ownership
of the shade of indigo because of his longstanding use of the shade and a
registered trademark.264 Should Monet be banned from using a particular
shade of indigo to depict water just because Picasso used the same or a similar
shade? When you boil down the dispute between YSL and Louboutin, the
fashion companies presented the courts with the same question.
After a brief recitation of the procedural history and facts, the Second
Circuit decided to approach the dispute in three parts: (1) whether a single
color is protectable in general and within the fashion industry, (2) whether
aesthetic functionality bars single color trademarks within the fashion
industry, and (3) whether the Red Sole Mark is a valid trademark under the
Lanham Act.265
The Second Circuit first analyzed whether the Red Sole Mark was
distinctive or whether it had acquired a secondary meaning in the minds of
the public.266 As the court noted, a mark is distinctive if it “serves to identify
a particular source.”267 A mark acquires secondary meaning if the primary
purpose of the mark is to identify the product’s source instead of the product
itself.268 Even if a trademark is deemed valid via inherent distinctiveness or
acquiring distinctiveness through secondary meaning, a challenger may
assert the traditional defense of functionality.269 The court noted that under
Qualitex, “aspects of a product that are ‘functional’ generally ‘cannot serve as
261
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a trademark.’”270 Functional features can only be extended protection
through patent law, where a time-limited monopoly is granted to the
inventor.271
The Second Circuit noted that federal trademark law provides two major
benefits: it exists to protect consumers from competitors using another’s
source-identifying mark and ensures the producer that they may enjoy the
reputation-related goodwill stemming from its mark and product.272
However, trademark law is not supposed to grant a monopoly over a
functional feature or inhibit legitimate competition.273 Such extensive
monopolies are the hallmarks of copyright and patent law which seek to grant
monopolies to inventors and innovators to encourage future innovation, not
trademark law which “seeks to preserve a ‘vigorously competitive market’ for
the benefit of consumers.”274
There are two types of functionality: utilitarian and aesthetic.275 While
both types are important in trademark law, the Second Circuit focused most
of its time analyzing aesthetic functionality. Under Qualitex, aesthetic
functionality occurs when the mark itself is the aesthetic design of a
product.276 Aesthetic functionality also exists when giving one company the
exclusive right to use the mark “would put competitors at a significant nonreputation-related disadvantage.”277
The Second Circuit set forth a three-part test for determining aesthetic
functionality.278 First, the court considered whether the mark is essential to
the product’s use or purpose, and then looked to whether it affects the quality
or cost of the product.279 Lastly, the court analyzed the unfair competition
aspect outlined in Qualitex.280 The Second Circuit emphasized that the
functionality doctrine does not guarantee the greatest range of a competitor’s
creativity and that its only purpose is to prevent monopolization.281 Instead
of thoughtfully combing through the district court’s analysis, the Second
270
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Circuit balked when it perceived that the district court had established a per
se rule for color trademarks within the fashion industry and made a rush to
judgment.282 The Second Circuit essentially swept aside a key point in
Qualitex that “a single color, standing alone, can almost never be inherently
distinctive because it does not ‘almost automatically tell a customer that [it]
refer[s] to a brand.’”283 Instead, the court inserted its own opinion a few
sentences later as the governing law: “We see no reason why a single-color
mark in the specific context of the fashion industry could not acquire
secondary meaning—and therefore serve as a brand or source identifier.”284
The Second Circuit considered Louboutin’s advertising expenditures,
successful sales figures, and consumer surveys to mean that the Red Sole
Mark had become a symbol and had acquired a secondary meaning when the
red sole contrasts with the shoe’s upper.285 Having hastily concluded that the
Red Sole Mark was enforceable because it had acquired secondary meaning,
the Second Circuit chose not to look at “the likelihood of consumer
confusion” or whether the Red Sole Mark was functional.286 Additionally, the
Second Circuit left several unanswered questions that were initiated by the
district court’s opinion. What color of red is going to be protected? Does the
protection extend to shoes besides high heels since the trademark registration
explicitly states high-end designer footwear? Does the trademark extend to
lower-end footwear? And what about consumer confusion? Moreover, in its
conclusion, the Second Circuit clung to its principle that “[t]he crucial
question in a case involving secondary meaning always is whether the public
is moved in any degree to buy an article because of its source.”287
However, such a “crucial question” overlooks the fact that consumers may
want to buy a product not because of its source, but because the monopoly
granted to the designer leaves them with only one option in exercising its
purchasing power. A legal scholar, Felix Cohen, voiced this concern in 1935
before the Lanham Act was even a glimmer in Congress’s eyes. Cohen wrote
that unfair competition laws operate through circular reasoning.288 He
further wrote that courts departed from the theory that trademarks protect
consumers against other producers passing off inferior goods with
282
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misleading marks.289 Instead, injunctive relief extends to “realms where no
actual danger of confusion to the consumer is present.”290 The vicious cycle
of circular reasoning goes as follows: legal protection is based on economic
value, but in reality “the economic value of a sales device depends upon the
extent to which it will be legally protected.”291 If commercial exploitation of
the mark or word does not occur, “the word will be of no more economic
value to any particular firm than a convenient size, shape, mode of packing,
or manner of advertising, common in the trade.”292 Thus, if courts do not
extend protection to words or marks, consumers will consider the words or
marks worthless, and their lack of perceived value will then bolster a court’s
decision not to protect those words or marks.293
The circular reasoning Cohen warned of is still alive and well in modern
trademark law. In the context of Louboutin shoes, if Louboutin did not have
a trademark on its red soles, the mark’s worth to the public would be severely
diminished or nonexistent because the public could get it elsewhere. Because
the public would not attach value to the Red Sole Mark due to a lack of
exclusivity, the court would then refuse to extend protection to it.
Exclusivity—not the mark itself—is what lends the mark value.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Second Circuit erred in its partial reversal of Louboutin by neglecting
to analyze the required consumer confusion prong in a section of the industry
where consumer confusion is unlikely to happen. Had the court looked at the
totality of circumstances in Louboutin regarding consumer confusion, the
lack of consumer confusion would yield YSL a favorable result. Further, the
Second Circuit improperly applied the aesthetic functionality doctrine and
ignored the long-term fairness and public policy ramifications of its decision.
The Second Circuit’s reversal proved to other companies, both in and out of
the fashion industry, that color monopolization is allowed and protected,
making some companies even more litigious.
Additionally, the Second Circuit misunderstood the district court’s
opinion by inferring a per se rule against enforcement of single-color
trademarks within the fashion industry. The district court never explicitly
mentioned such a rule within its opinion. Instead, the district court took a
thoughtful, multifaceted approach to its analysis leading it to the conclusion
289
290
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292
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that the Lanham Act could not serve as “the source of the broad spectrum of
absurdities that would follow recognition of a trademark for the use of a
single color for fashion items.”294 Its fanciful hypotheticals obviously annoyed
the Second Circuit, which may in part have led to the appellate court’s quick
analysis and partial reversal.
The Second Circuit adopted the Polaroid factors in issues concerning
likelihood of confusion yet failed to address any of the Polaroid factors when
analyzing the Louboutin dispute.295 Hypocritically, the Second Circuit
reprimanded a district court’s failure to analyze all eight Polaroid factors in
2005.296 As the Second Circuit eloquently noted, the Polaroid factors are
“ingrained in the trademark jurisprudence” yet the court failed to address
them in the Louboutin dispute.297 One factor in particular—the sophistication
of buyers—asks courts to consider the likelihood of confusion from the
consumer’s perspective. The cornerstone sub-factor courts consider when
analyzing consumer sophistication, or lack thereof, is price.298 The theory is
that the higher the price, the more sophisticated the consumer is.299
Due to the high price point of luxury goods, sophistication of buyers is a
highly relevant factor when considering luxury footwear like Louboutin and
YSL. If women “know their perfume,” then they certainly know luxury
footwear. In established luxury markets like the United States, the majority
of luxury purchases happen in a traditional brick-and-mortar store, and 72%
of luxury shoppers perform some form of online research before
purchasing.300 Even in the digital age, 65% of luxury shoppers prefer to
interact with a luxury product before purchasing.301 With the average age of
luxury shoppers in established markets skewing middle-aged at forty-six, and
the average price of their last luxury purchase topping $2,200, it is hard to
argue that luxury consumers are not sophisticated buyers.302
As mentioned above, to prove trademark infringement, a plaintiff must
show the defendant’s mark will likely confuse consumers about the source of
294
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a product or service.303 While market analyses of YSL and Louboutin are not
available to the public, judging by the similar price ranges of the two brands’
shoes, the limited number of luxury stores that carry the brands’ shoes, and
what is known about established luxury markets, the average consumer of
both brands is largely price insensitive.304 Luxury shoppers are repeat luxury
consumers, adding to the inference that these buyers are sophisticated and
know what they are purchasing.305 Take, for example, the shopper
demographics of Neiman Marcus, a luxury department store that sells both
YSL and Louboutin products. Over 40% of Neiman Marcus shoppers have a
net worth of at least $1 million.306 These are not hasty, passive shoppers but
experienced, sophisticated luxury consumers.
Now, this is not to say that Neiman Marcus’s customer
demographics perfectly overlap with YSL’s and Louboutin’s, but the store’s
demographics and data on luxury shoppers in established markets give some
good insight into how luxury goods are purchased. Select luxury retailers or
designers’ official stores sell luxury goods. When shoppers go into a Neiman
Marcus or a similar luxury department store, they are not going to be
confused about what type of shoe they are purchasing. Each brand’s shoes are
placed together on a tiered display table and have conspicuously placed
signage indicating the designer, not to mention there are multiple salespeople
lingering around, eager to help a prospective customer. If the
monochromatic red YSL shoe were placed on a display table surrounded by
other YSL shoes, the average shopper would not think that the shoe was
designed by anyone else. It is also important to note that the YSL launched
the Tribute heels in 2009 and are an iconic design for the brand,
strengthening the conclusion that luxury shoppers would not mistake a
signature YSL design for a Louboutin shoe.307
The Second Circuit failed to mention that an all-red version of the Tribute
appeared in YSL’s 2008 Cruise Collection without issue after Louboutin was
granted the trademark.308 A quick internet search of the YSL Tribute and any
303
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Louboutin design further proves the improbability of consumer confusion.
The YSL Tribute prominently features the brand’s logo in gold on the shoe’s
insole and has a visible, deep platform and an open-toed strappy design.309 In
the words of the Victoria and Albert Museum, the Tribute “is strikingly
similar in shape to shoes worn for pole-dancing.”310 This is a sharp contrast
to the sleek and often business-professional-type heels manufactured by
Louboutin. The Tribute’s design is largely out of character compared to
Louboutin’s classic stiletto designs.
Color has a relatively limited universe. Within the Pantone color system
used for fashion design there are 2,625 colors.311 While this may on its face
seem like a massive number of colors available within the fashion industry, if
courts adopted the method that Louboutin proposed to the District Court for
the Southern District of New York—banning the use of a range of shades
above and below a brand’s targeted color—the Pantone system would quickly
deplete. Although the district court spent too much of its opinion waxing
poetically about the hypothetical Picasso and Monet color trademark dispute,
it eventually made an excellent point with the hypothetical:
No one would argue that a painter should be barred from
employing a color intended to convey a basic concept
because another painter, while using that shade as an
expressive feature of a similar work, also staked out a claim
to it as a trademark in that context. . . . The law should not
countenance restraints that would interfere with creativity
and stifle competition by one designer, while granting
another a monopoly invested with the right to exclude use of
an ornamental or functional medium necessary for freest
and most productive artistic expression by all engaged in the
same enterprise.312
If Louboutin can own the color red, who is to say another designer will not
try to own green? In fact, the brand Reginald Bendolph is trying to do that
exact thing and is even using Louboutin’s drawing in its trademark
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application.313 While color depletion and monopolization may not have
seemed like an issue to the Supreme Court when considering green dry
cleaning press pads and pink insulation, it is certainly an issue in an industry
that uses color and aesthetics as key selling points. People buy clothes
because, in part, people are attracted to them. Colors, like trends, change
throughout the years, and people are undoubtedly influenced by such
changes and the top-down nature of fashion trends. Take, for example, the
oft-quoted cerulean sweater monologue from the 2006 film The Devil Wears
Prada, where a fashion magazine editor informs her new assistant just how
top-down color in fashion is and how no one is immune:
You go to your closet and you select . . . that lumpy blue
sweater, for instance because you’re trying to tell the world
that you take yourself too seriously to care about what you
put on your back. But what you don’t know is that that
sweater is not just blue, it’s not turquoise. It’s not lapis. It’s
actually cerulean. . . . [Y]ou’re also blithely unaware of the
fact that in 2002, Oscar de la Renta did a collection of
cerulean gowns. And then I think it was Yves Saint
Laurent . . . who showed cerulean military jackets? . . . And
then cerulean quickly showed up in the collections of eight
different designers. And then it . . . filtered down through
the department stores and then trickled on down into some
tragic Casual Corner where you, no doubt, fished it out of
some clearance bin. However, that blue represents millions
of dollars and countless jobs and it’s sort of comical how you
think that you’ve made a choice that exempts you from the
fashion industry when, in fact, you’re wearing the sweater
that was selected for you by the people in this room . . .314
This cerulean-blue monologue rings true for those in the industry as “what
might appear on a runway in the Musée Rodin (where Dior holds its shows)
in July will affect what H&M does in August.”315 It is not just YSL and
Louboutin that influence what designers design and, in turn, sell to us. It is
also the celebrities, royalty, and political figures that have influence. For
313
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example, President Kennedy is touted as the reason why American men
finally hung up the top hat after he chose not to wear one for the majority of
his inauguration day.316 For an example from across the pond, the Duchess
of Cambridge is hailed as a powerful influencer in the fashion industry.317
When the Duchess wears something, it instantly sells out and increases in
desirability, not only in the United Kingdom, but also among consumers
based in the United States.318
When considering possible copyright protection for fashion, one law
review article quoted Coco Chanel, who said trying to protect fashion, a
seasonal art, “is childish” and “[o]ne should not bother to protect that which
dies the minute it was born.”319 Yet, Louboutin and other designers clamoring
for trademark protection for color and beyond are doing just that.
Beyond the fashion industry, Pantone has a stake in making sure color
trademarks remain a trend. The Pantone company itself has a stake in the
fashion industry. The Pantone Institute has named a “color of the year” for
more than two decades and through its chosen color, attempts to capture the
mood of the year reflected by global culture.320 Pantone selects the color of
the year several years in advance, giving fashion designers a clue as to what
shades their designs should hold.321 Pantone even provides fashion designers
with algorithms that track how often certain colors are searched for so
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designers know what colors people are looking for, thereby helping designers
make informed decisions during the production process.322
Outside of the fashion industry, courts have noted that allowing color
trademarks on food labels would unduly hinder competition. In Campbell
Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., “the court refused to protect the red and white
colors of Campbell’s labels on the ground that if Campbell were to
‘monopolize red in all of its shades’ competition would be affected in an
industry where colored labels were customary.”323 The court in OwensCorning mentioned the Campbell’s Soup court’s brief revival of the color
depletion theory in its opinion when it stated that “there are a limited number
of colors in the palette, and that it is not wise policy to foster further
limitation by permitting trademark registrants to deplete the reservoir.”324 If
courts were worried about color depletion on soup cans and match ends, it is
reasonable to extend such concerns to shoes.
A.

Negative Ramification: A Very Bland World

For a broader context, the color trademark war extends outside of the
fashion industry. T-Mobile is notorious for its hawk-like protection of
magenta. In 2014, T-Mobile sued Aio Wireless, an AT&T subsidiary, over the
color plum.325 T-Mobile alleged that Aio Wireless’s use of plum (Pantone
676C) in its advertising was too close to T-Mobile’s iconic Pantone Process
Magenta color and would likely cause consumer confusion.326 It is important
to recognize that all “primary and secondary colors (red, yellow, blue, green,
orange) except violet are owned in the prepaid/wireless space,” so Aio
Wireless was fairly limited in what colors it could choose from.327 Although
Aio Wireless used a different font—a completely different Pantone color—
and different slogans for its branding, the court still found in favor of TMobile.328
In late 2019, T-Mobile decided that its ownership of pink extended to an
insurance company, Lemonade, when it brought suit against the insurance
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company for using pink in its advertisements.329 T-Mobile’s legal department
may be thrilled with all of the extra work executives are throwing their way,
but the company’s legal disputes are childish at best. Shai Wininger, COO
and co-founder of Lemonade, made a poignant statement in defiance of TMobile’s actions: “monopolizing all the pink in the world sounds like
something a cartoon villain would do in a Disney epic. . . . It’s the move of a
big corporation that has run out of good ideas.”330 This begs the question: are
Louboutin’s actions reminiscent of Scar trying to topple Mufasa so he could
rule Pride Rock, or is Louboutin just another big corporation, clutching the
last inventive idea it had for the stiletto?
Look back to the actual purpose of trademarks—they are first, and
foremost source indicators. Case by case, trademark rights are interpreted to
be an ever-expanding universe where almost anything can act as a source
indicator and gain protection. When trademark rights are extended beyond
their purpose to such an extent as they are now, one starts to wonder where
protection of intellectual property rights stop and protection of an unlawful
monopoly begins.
V. SOLUTION
This note is not advocating for a per se rule against color trademarks as a
whole. While single color trademarks within the fashion industry should be
deemed per se aesthetically functional, single color trademarks in other
industries may still be maintained within the purpose of the Lanham Act. An
alternative approach is needed to determine how color trademarks are
granted and enforced. The current trademark laws within the United States
are broad—offering protection to everything from colors, scents, and
sounds.331 Although U.S. trademark laws look like they reward innovators
and promote creativity, the extent of protection restricts freedom of
expression and creativity in the marketplace. Restricting colors, scents, and
words suppresses the creativity of innovators and entrepreneurs which
intellectual property law is supposed to promote.
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Those who advocate for more intellectual property protection for fashion
designs specifically argue that restricting such protection will encourage
design piracy and knockoffs and, in turn, harm the fashion industry.
However, this argument is largely unfounded. Law professors Kal Raustiala
and Christopher Springman argue that fashion thrives due to copying and
that extending copyright protection to fashion designs would ultimately
harm the industry.332 Restricting trademark, patent, and copyright
protection, particularly within the fashion industry, encourages constant
innovation instead of a design stalemate.
Diane Von Furstenberg, a high-end women’s clothing designer known for
slim-fitting wrap dresses, calls herself a victim of fashion piracy and
advocates for more protection for fashion designers.333 In an op-ed for the
L.A. Times, Furstenberg wrote that the lack of intellectual property
protection for fashion designers in the United States harms emerging fashion
designers.334 While Ms. Furstenberg alleges that the expansive intellectual
property protection would protect emerging designers, it most definitely
would benefit her namesake brand, DVF, as well. Furstenberg’s design studio
sued Forever 21 for creating a yellow floral dress in a pattern similar to one
she created and subsequently sued Target for creating a wrap dress with a
jersey fabric similar to her designs.335 Through these suits, Furstenberg
attempted to claim complete ownership of not only a yellow flower pattern
but of a fabric’s appearance on a hanger, as Furstenberg argued that the fabric
reminiscent of silk jersey infringed on the styles “consumers and the general
public have come to associate with DVF.”336 Reminiscent of T-Mobile’s
clutch on magenta and Louboutin’s claim to red, overly expansive intellectual
property protection creates power-hungry companies.
The Qualitex Court noted that the functionality doctrines are supposed to
be the barrier that protects competitors against unfair disadvantages that
trademark law ordinarily inflicts, yet the Supreme Court’s holdings regarding
332
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color trademarks have essentially eliminated that barrier completely.337
Courts must construe the precedent and policy of aesthetic functionality to
bar single color trademarks within the fashion industry. Like the argument
made in Campbell Soup, monopolization of colors in an industry where color
is customary should not be allowed. While color depletion seemed like an
“occasional problem” to the Supreme Court in 1995, it is not a rare
occurrence anymore, especially considering the cases involving T-Mobile,
Louboutin, and Glossier, a beauty and skincare company that just received a
trademark for its “millennial pink” packaging and relied on the Louboutin
Red Sole Mark to do so.338 Arguably, color within the fashion industry passes
the traditional functionality test outlined by the Supreme Court in Inwood
Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories in that it is essential to the product and
affects the cost or quality in some way.339 It is almost impossible to deny that
color in fashion fits squarely within the aesthetic functionality doctrine in
that color is a necessary competitive element in the fashion industry. The
Seventh Circuit, in determining whether a type of gilded paper for books is
trade dress eligible, explained aesthetic functionality in a simple way: “Mink
coats are normally sold dyed. The dye does not make the coat any warmer,
but it makes it more beautiful, and, once again, it could not be claimed as
trade dress by the first furrier to have hit on the idea.”340 Why should a court
or the USPTO grant a perpetual monopoly on a color just because a
trademark applicant was one of the first to apply it in a certain way?
In restricting the Qualitex holding, courts developed the aesthetic
functionality doctrine, which should extend to all single-color trademarks in
the fashion industry because the doctrine applies when there is a “competitive
advantage because of its visual appeal.”341 A usurpation of colors from the
fashion industry not only puts designers at a significant competitive
disadvantage but also takes away a necessary element of the marketplace and
causes consumers to suffer as a result.
For those who argue that granting color trademarks in the fashion
industry is irrelevant or merely a peripheral matter in larger issues within
intellectual property, history shows that overly expansive intellectual
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property rights do not occur overnight.342 It is the slow erosion of the purpose
and policy behind each respective intellectual property right that leads to
overly expansive monopolies which eventually affect other areas of
intellectual property.343 For example, the term of copyright protection
continues to be expanded, calling into question what “limited times” for
protection really means.344 Within the international trademark realm, the
European Union abolished the graphic representability requirement for
trademark applications in 2017, thereby eliminating the implied assumption
that consumers need to see the source indicator at the point of sale, and it
would not be surprising if more countries, including the United States,
followed in the EU’s footsteps.345
While single color trademarks in the fashion industry should be barred,
single color trademarks in other industries should be reevaluated and granted
in a narrow fashion. In addition to the current registration requirements,
color trademarks should be required to register the Pantone or CYMK/RGB
percentage equivalent so that the public and competitors are put on notice as
to exactly what color will be protected. Only the exact color registered should
receive protection. Objective color evaluations should be a priority to ensure
that protection only extends to the exact colors registered with the USPTO.
Additionally, the color registered should only extend protection within the
market that the registrant’s product serves. Under this approach, T-Mobile
would not have standing to sue an insurance company for using magenta in
its advertising, and YSL is free to paint shoes whatever color it desires.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit’s reversal of Louboutin shows that color
monopolization by large companies, such as Louboutin and T-Mobile, are
342
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permissible and protected. The ambiguous and ineffectual analysis handed
down by both the district court and Second Circuit caused a negative domino
effect for both large and small companies. Unfortunately, color trademark
cases are sparse, especially within the fashion industry. Since most civil cases
are settled out of court and litigation is expensive, it may take a long time
before solid law in accordance with the Lanham Act’s true purpose is ever
handed down.346 Bigger players in the marketplace like Louboutin and TMobile have the big law attorneys and the substantial bank account needed
to threaten expensive litigation against smaller businesses, thereby
guaranteeing their trademark rights. The U.S. courts and Congress need to
reevaluate what trademarks are supposed to protect and determine what the
purpose and policy behind trademark law is really supposed to be. After all,
imitation is the highest form of flattery.347
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